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Gorsky: Management Rights Revisited: How the Good Ship Warrior & Gulf Sa

Management Rights Revisited: How the Good
Ship "Warrior & Gulf"* Sailed Up the Potomac
River and Wound Up in Metropolitan Toronto:**
M. R. GORSKY***
1.

RESERVED RIGHTS AND IMPLIED LIMITATIONS THE GENERAL SCHEME

Prior to collective bargaining legislation in Canada and the United
States, management's legal obligations to consider the interests of
employees was limited only by common law, a small number of statutes
affecting the employment relationship, statutes imposing health and
safety obligations, workmen's compensation statutes, and the willingness of employees to work under the conditions imposed.' A common philosophical tenet among representatives of management was
that matters such as wages, hours and working conditions should be
any intervention by governdetermined by market conditions and that
2
ment is an unwarranted interference.
After the adoption of collective bargaining legislation, serious
questions arose as to how the new labour statutes might limit management's actions and how they might affect unions and bargaining unit
* The Warrior& Gulfof the title is a water transportation company operating
as a contract carrier of vessels along southern waterways in the United States. It became
famous as a result of a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court involving the scope
of arbitral authority and management rights: United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). The case is associated with two other cases, making
up the Steelworker's Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
** The competing philosophies of arbitration considered in the Trilogy cases also
were the focus in the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Re Metropolitan Toronto Board
of Commissioners of Police and Metropolitan Toronto Police Ass'n et al. 33 Ont.2d 476
(1981). The purpose of this article is to examine the way in which the American doctrine
of collective bargaining interpretation has affected Canadian jurisprudence in the same
area. While recognizing the differences that exist, I have concluded that similarities have
been obscured as a result of the failure to appreciate the more limited meaning of Warrior& Gulf and the more expanded interpretation of which Metro-Policeis capable. My
conclusions support a philosophy of collective bargaining interpretation which rejects the
extreme positions of proponents of the rival philosophies of the reserved rights and
implied limitations schools of collective agreement interpretation.
*** Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario
1. Warrior& Gulf, 363 U.S. at 583. This statement is also applicable in Canada
and is implicit in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Metro-Police, 33 Ont.2d at 478.
Cf. Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd., 8 L.A.C. 276, 281 (1958).
2. See Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Management Control, 16 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 187-89, 191 (1963).
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employees. 3 The developing statutory pattern imposed an obligation
on the parties in a collective bargaining relationship to bargain in
good faith; one of the stated goals of the legislation was to create
viable collective bargaining relationships whereby the company and
the union would execute collective-agreements binding on the company, the union and the members of the bargaining unit. As a result
of the new statutory pattern,
a new era began in which the battle
4
lines were quickly drawn.

For extreme adherents to the traditional union position, the
collective agreement was not even close kin to the traditional contract of employment. As harbinger to a new era in the employment
relationship, the collective agreement, unless it specifically provided
otherwise, put the parties on an equal footing. If the agreement did
not specifically address a particular subject, then management was
deprived of the unilateral right to act in relation to that subject
without achieving an agreement with the union.5 To the similarly
extreme advocates of the management position, the union approach
was seen as looking at things the wrong way. In the union philosophy,
collective agreements were products of historical and sociological forces
which sought by statute to remove much of management's former
power to act unilaterally. In management's view, however, the
statutory purpose was more narrowly directed toward the establishment of a collective bargaining regime; it did not seek to impose on
the parties any particular agreement or, for that matter, any agreement should the parties, while bargaining in good faith, pursue a
bargaining position to an impasse. From an extreme management
perspective, an agreement retained for management its pre-collective
bargaining rights unless those rights had been specifically altered by
the bargain.'
That such extreme positions could not co-exist was obvious, and
it was inevitable that adjudication would ensue. It is not surprising
that when the issue first arose there would be a difference in approach
and a difference in result among cases tried before judges, those tried
3. Id. at 190.
4. As to the duty to bargain in good faith with a view to concluding a collective
agreement, see LABOUR RELATIONS LAW, QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
CENTRE (3d ed. 1981).
5. See Vladek, 16 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 218-20 (1963). Professor Vladek, in his
customarily blunt manner, suggested that theorists tended to use the terms "reserved
rights" and "implied limitations" as if they knew what they "are talking about." Certainly, different theorists have different views on the subject of what those terms mean.
6. See Landau, 16 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 215 (1963). As will be demonstrated,
the same debate arose in Canada at about the same time.
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before arbitrators and those first tried before arbitrators and subsequently reviewed by judges.! Judges, with their historical attachment
to the principles of the common law of contract interpretation, tended
to view the collective agreement as merely another kind of contract
to which they applied the knowledge and analytic approach that they
employed in cases subject to the traditional rules of contract
Arbitrators of grievances arising under collective agreements, although
usually more sensitive to the position of unions as outlined above,
tended not to accept the more extreme union position. Nor did those
arbitrators who were more receptive to the management position
accept its most extreme articulation.9
Everything I have said thus far applies to both Canada and the
United States as the labour legislation in the two countries is quite
similar."0 A union is afforded legal legitimacy and the capacity to obtain
recognition and certification as the exclusive bargaining agent for a
unit of employees deemed appropriate for this purpose. Labour relations tribunals have been established to adjudicate whether a union
ought to be certified as bargaining agent or to be continued as such
once certified or voluntarily recognized. They also deal with unfair
labour practice complaints alleging that either management, unions
or others have unlawfully interfered with the right of employees (and
in some cases non-employees) to join unions or participate in lawful
union activities.
The above provisions would be of little significance without further statutory enactments which oblige the parties to bargain in good
faith with a view to concluding a collective agreement governing their
relationship, especially with respect to wages, hours and working conditions. By making bargaining in bad faith an unfair labour practice
and by reposing in a labour relations board the remedial authority
7. See Dash, The Arbitration of SubcontractingDiputaes, 16 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
209, 211 (1963). Although Dash was dealing with the subject of subcontracting, the
method of treatment would be identical in the case of arbitration involving any aspect
of management functions. Cf. Seward, Arbitrationand the Functionsof Management, 16
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 265 (1963) and Landau, supra note 6, at 217.
8. See the judgments of the District Court in United Steelworkers of American
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 168 F.Supp. 702, 705 (1958) and the Court of Appeals, United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf, 269 F.2d 633, 635 (1959).
9. See Dash, supra note 7, at 224-25 (Tables 1 and 2).
10. Because most Americans appear to have as much interest in the Albanian
as in the Canadian legal systems, I would refer the interested American reader to the
Canadian work, LABOUR RELATIONS LAW, supranote 4, where there are numerous references
to comparable Canadian labour legislation and where a suitable debt is paid to those attributes of the Canadian legislation which have been influenced by the experience in the
United States.
REV.
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to deal with breaches of the statutory duty, the chances of concluding
an agreement are enhanced. Recognition of the right to strike or lockout, usually after the expiration of an existing agreement and subject to other time limitations, further enhances the likelihood of an
agreement being reached.
In most jurisdictions, the means of dealing with questions arising out of unresolved disagreements pertaining to the interpretation,
application or alleged violation of the collective agreement will be
through arbitration. The award of an arbitrator or board of arbitration is final and binding on the parties and on anyone else subject to it.
When the issue of management rights, or viewed from a union
perspective, management limitations, first arose in the United States,
it was in the context of collective agreements which either did not
specifically address the matter in issue, for example, subcontracting,
or whose language was unclear as to whether the agreement applied.
Such a basis for an arbitrator's jurisdiction over disputes regarding
the extent of a management right has often been lost sight of because
of the relative inviolability of the arbitral award in the United States.
As a result, it has frequently been found that limitations on management's exercise of its authority exist regardless of the presence of
a provision in the agreement, particularly in the management rights
clause, that relegate its exercise exclusively to management's
discretion."
2.

ENTER THE WARRIOR & GULF CASE

The paradigm American case on arbitrability of labourmanagement disputes is United Steelworkers of American v. Warrior
and Gulf Navigation Company.'" This case arose out of an action by
the union to compel arbitration of a grievance. There are certain
statements contained in the headnote which may distort what was
said by the majority of the Supreme Court:
Action by union to compel arbitration by employer. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, 168 F.Supp. 702, entered judgment for employer
and union appealed. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, 269 F.2d 633, affirmed and Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Douglas, held that where collective bargaining agreement

11.
12.

See Dash, supra note 7, at 224-25 (Table 2).
363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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provided that if differences arose or any local trouble of
any kind arose a grievance procedure including arbitration
should be applicable, notwithstanding inclusion of a clause
that matters which were strictly a function of management
should not be subject to arbitration, grievance arising
because of employer's action in contracting out maintenance
work previously done by its employees was subject to
arbitration. 3
The clause in question stated:
Issues which conflict with any Federal statute in its
application as established by Court procedure or matters
which are strictly a function of management shall not be
subject to arbitration under this section."
If the court had not found that clause to be "not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute," then it would have
treated the subject as exclusive to management's discretion and not
within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator."5 Put another way: In the
Warrior & Gulf case, if the language "strictly a function of management" had been spelled out so as to leave no real doubt that it covered
the matter in dispute, that is, subcontracting, then the court would
have held that management had "complete control and unfettered
discretion" to act in the disputed area."6 The Supreme Court did not
say that the collective agreement had to specifically exclude the
disputed power from the grievance procedure; it was only necessary
that the language employed, even if included in a written collateral
agreement, "make clear" that the matter in dispute "was not a matter for arbitration."" In the Warrior& Gulf case, the exclusion clause
was found to be too vague to permit a peremptory finding of
non-arbitrability.' 8 The headnote misleadingly suggests that a management rights clause is irrelevant.
Another holding of the Warrior & Gulf case, also frequently
overlooked, is the Court's pronouncement that where there is doubt
concerning the arbitrable nature of the dispute, the arbitrator may
yet find that management, "under particular circumstances prescribed

13.
14.

Id. at 576.
Id-

15. I& at 582-83.
16. Id. at 584.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 585.
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by the agreement ... is permitted to indulge" in the disputed conduct free of limitations." In fact, such deference to arbitration may
lead to an opposite conclusion: that management may not indulge in
the disputed conduct.
The Supreme Court, in Warrior & Gulf, did not deal with a
management rights clause as such, but the clause under review concerned management rights nonetheless. And, after all, what's in a
name? Certainly, it is not the name "management rights clause" that
matters, but, as the court noted in Warriors & Gulf, the nature and
extent of the right given management by the clause under review.
Perhaps one of the significant reasons why the arbitrability question has remained more or less dormant in the United States is due
to another holding of the Supreme Court in Warrior & Gulf. With
the benefit of the doubt to be given to arbitrability, which question
is to be decided by the arbitrator, there was also bestowed on the
award of the arbitrator, both as to arbitrability and on the merits,
a shield against subsequent review by the courts. Such a bulwark
against judicial intervention enabled arbitrators to develop a
jurisprudence of "implied limitations" where a decision was made in
favour of arbitrability."'
As there is no magic in the term "management rights clause,"
there is no reason to restrict the message of Warrior & Gulf to subcontracting cases. It was only fortuitous that subcontracting was the
subject of Warrior & Gulf. The subject could have been any power
to act claimed by management.
What remains somewhat a mystery is why the panoply of
"implied limitations" discovered by arbitrators, after they ruled in
favour of arbitrability, was deemed appropriate. 1 Some of the choices
are clearly applicable and have even secured acceptance from die-hard
proponents of an extreme reserved rights approach to contract interpretation. Thus, good faith, in the sense of a genuine desire to rely
on the power in question, would be necessary to justify the power's
exercise.' A purported exercise of the power for purposes extraneous

19.

Id.

20. Id. See also United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 567 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car,
363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
21. See Dash, supra note 9. Professor Viadek's comments appear appropriate,
as well, to the particular "implied limitations" found to exist by arbitrators. Vladek, supra
note 5.
22. "[Management's] decision should be in good faith ...Management should
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to its recognized uses would be improper as having been resorted
to in bad faith. Where the evidence disclosed that the real purpose
for relying on the clause in question was to achieve a result incapable
of realization because of the existence of rights created by other contract provisions, then such exercise would also be improper as having been carried out in bad faith.
The Supreme Court, in Warrior & Gulf, recognized that the
extreme implied limitations and reserved rights theories were
inapplicable.' Management is neither unrestricted in the exercise of
its functions nor completely restricted, in the absence of contract provisions which can be interpreted as an agreement with the union. The
extent of management's powers is to be derived from the agreement.
Thus, in the absence of a provision which leaves a particular subject
matter to management's "complete control and unfettered discretion,"'
the extent of management's power to act freely, except as limited
by public law and the willingness of employees to work under the
conditions imposed, will be determined by the arbitrator.'
Where the language of the agreement does not preclude arbitration with respect to the disputed management power, the matters
which may be considered by the arbitrator, according to the majority
opinion in War-rior & Gulf are much broader than those which would
apply in the case of conventional contract interpretations:
(1) The collective agreement "is more than a contract."26 (2)
The collective agreement creates "a new common law-the
common law of a particular industry or a particular plant.""
(3) Because "[glaps may be left to be filled in by reference
to the practice of the particular industry and various steps
covered by the agreement,"' and because "many of the
specific practices which underlie the agreement may be
unknown except in hazy form, even to the negotiators," the
arbitrator is to be permitted to fill in the gaps in the agreement by reference to practice.(4) The courts are seen

never be permitted to exercise its rights for the purpose of destroying or harming
the Union. . ." Landau, supra note 6, at 218.
23.

Warrior, 363 U.S. at 583-84.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 584.
I& at 583.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580
Id. at 580-81.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [1984], Art. 6

130

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.19

merely as a vehicle to "bring into operation the arbitral
process" leaving to the arbitrator the question of whether
the agreement has been violated, including the interpretation of the agreement."
Buttressing the jurisdiction of arbitrators to interpret collective
agreements without threat of judicial review is the pronouncement
of the United States Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America
v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,' which prohibited a court from
interfering with the award merely because the court's interpretation
of the contract would be different.2 The Supreme Court decreed that
only doubt as to arbitrability, as well as any decision on the merits,
should be left to the arbitrator. The inevitable result was a
jurisprudence pertaining to management rights which is more sensitive to the concerns of the Supreme
Court and of many arbitrators
33
than was formerly the case.
A revolution in the philosophy of collective agreement interpretation was wrought by the Supreme Court in Warrior & Gulf. Therefore,
it is useful to examine what philosophy was replaced. On its face,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Warrior & Gulf appears
strongly to accord with an extreme management rights position:
[W]hatever subjects are not covered by an employment contract are left to the parties to act upon as they see fit. The
contract before us does not deal with the power of the
employer to perform services previously done by its
employees. Since this is a matter as to which an employer
may, except as limited by a specific collective bargaining
agreement, act without violating either state or federal law
it remains, so far as it relates to this agreement, strictly
a matter of management.U
However, this holding was unnecessary, as it was held that by the
agreement of the parties the subject of subcontracting was made

30. Id. at 585.
31. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
32. Id. at 599. This is not the rule in Canada where the award is often subject
to judicial review where there has been an error of law on the face of the record, often
described in terms of a finding which the language of the agreement will not reasonably
bear.
33. See Browne, The Impact of Supree CourtDecisionson The CollectiveBargaining, 51 A. B. A. J. 139 (1965).
34. Warrior, 269 F.2d at 636.
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"strictly a matter of management."" It is also interesting to note the
statement of Chief Justice Rives (dissenting), who observed that the
management rights clause in the Warrior & Gulf agreement could
not, by its terms, sustain the premise that subcontracting was "strictly
a management function.""
In understanding the message of the Supreme Court in Warrior
& Gulf, it is important to note that where the union characterizes
management's actions as being "unreasonable, unjust and
discriminatory," as was the case before the Court of Appeals in Warrior& Gulf, the epithets cannot advance the union's position. Employing the language of fairness "cannot change the fact that the criticized
action, by whatever name called," where it is excluded from review
through arbitration, "remains exempted from the range of
arbitration."' If, as was decided by the Supreme Court, the employer's
action was not excluded from arbitral review, and if the arbitrator
then decided that the matter was arbitrable," the basis for concluding
that the right to act was a limited one rested not on abstract grounds
of fairness (unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, bad faith) but on
somewhat more concrete grounds. 9 Fairness, while a factor in assessing the complained of conduct, is not the only criterion whereby the
scope of the right to act is assessed.
3.

MANAGEMENT RIGHTS IN CANADA

Given the similarities between the Canadian and American labour
statutes and the functioning of labour relations in both countries, it
was inevitable that Canadian arbitrators and courts would be called
upon to address problems similar to those faced in Warrior & Gulf.
As arbitration developed in Canada, arbitrators similarly gravitated
toward positions on a spectrum ranging from an extreme reserved
rights approach to an implied limitation of rights approach. In the
case of the latter, I have never encountered a Canadian arbitrator
subscribing to the implied limitation of rights view who would go
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id at 639.
Id. at 637.
Id.
It is of interest to note that after the matter was remitted back to the arbitrator (Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 36 LA 696 (J. Fred Hally. 1962)), the arbitrator
first found in favour of arbitrability on the basis of negotiating history, and then held
in favour of the grievance on the basis, among others, of the parties having recognized
by their actions, some limitations upon the employer's right to subcontract work.
39. See Dash, supra note 9,at 224-25 (Tables Iand 2). As will be seen, in Ontario.
although concrete factors are referred to, the jurisprudence-is couched in the language

of fairness.
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beyond imposing a rather moderate restriction on management's
actions when these actions were otherwise not affected by the agreement. The philosophy articulated by the late Chief Justice Laskin of
the Supreme Court of Canada, when he was an arbitrator and law professor, has found favour with those who accept the moderate imposition of limitations on management's freedom to act. In Re Falconbridge
Mines Nickel Ltd.,0 Professor Laskin, as he then was, set out the two
competing views of reserved rights and implied limitations. The positions set out by Laskin are virtually indistinguishable from their
moderate American counterparts. Laskin placed himself firmly in the
implied limitations camp.
The extreme management rights position as set out by Laskin'1
was articulated by Thomas, C.C.J., sitting as an arbitrator in the Re
Electric Auto Lite case.'
The company has the right to manage its business to the
best of its ability in every respect, except to the extent
that its rights are cut down by voluntary abrogation of some
of these rights through contract with the union. The
reservations (not restrictions) to management clause which
appear in most contracts are nothing but a gratuitous
acknowledgement by the union of this fundamental right.
If the board is unable to find anything in the contract
between the parties which takes away from the company's
rights to conduct its own business, then it cannot be concerned with the quality of the action taken by the company,
nor whether it results in loss of jobs for employees of the
company, nor whether the action which produced such
results was exercised inside the four walls of the plant or
elsewhere."
The opposing view, favoured by Laskin, was set out as follows:
There is an opposing view which was noted but not followed
by Lane, C.C.J., in the Duplate case, .

.

. where he spoke

of the theory that 'both parties, the union on one side and
the management on the other, approach the bargaining table
without fetters and as equals, and there is no such thing
as a residual right in either party, and the parties by mutual
agreement set out the whole contract either by specific
agreement or by implied agreement which is implied by
40.
41.
42.

8 L.A.C. 276 (1958).
Id at 280-81.
Re Electric Auto Lite, 7 L.A.C. 331 (1957).

43.

Id.
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those parts of the agreement set out and according to the
spirit of the whole agreement itself.' This theory or
philosophy of approach, that a collective agreement is an
expression of limited powers (or rights and obligations) of
the respective parties, and that differences between them
must be resolved not only within the terms, but in accordance with the purposes of a collective agreement, is the
concept which was reflected by Roach, J.A., in the Standard Sanitary case .... More recently it was deliberately

applied by Cross, C.C.J., in Re U.A.W. & Studebaker-Packard
(1957), 7 Lab. Arb. Cas. 310, who held that the company
had violated its agreement with the union in contracting
its janitor work to an outside firm even though the existing
janitorial staff had been transferred to other bargaining unit
work so that no loss of jobs was involved."
For reasons which will, I hope, become clearer when I deal with
the current state of the law in some Canadian jurisdictions, Laskin
placed some reliance on a rule of conventional contract interpretation: Where it is "necessary, give practical or business efficacy to the
collective agreement.""5
Laskin had previously stated in the Peterboro Lock 6 case a view
parallel to that of the United States Supreme Court in the Steelworker
Trilogy.
In this board's view, it is a very superficial generalization
to contend that a collective agreement must be read as
limiting an employer's pre-collective bargaining prerogatives
only to the extent expressly stipulated. Such a generalization ignores completely the climate of employer-employee
relations under a collective agreement. The change from
individual to collective bargaining is a change in kind and
not merely a difference in degree. The introduction of a
collective bargaining regime involves the acceptance by the
parties of assumptions which are entirely alien to an era
of individual bargaining. Hence, any attempt to measure
rights and duties in employer-employee relations by
reference to pre-collective bargaining standards is an
attempt to re-enter a world which has ceased to exist. Just

44.
45.

Falconbridge,8 L.A.C. at 281.
Id. at 282.

46.

Peterboro Lock, 4 L.A.C. 1499 (1953) (quoted in Falconbridge,8 L.A.C. at

282-83).
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as the period of individual bargaining had its own common
law worked out empirically over many years, so does a
collective bargaining regime have a common law to be
invoked to give consistency and meaning to the collective
agreement on which it is based."
It is of the greatest significance that Laskin, in Falconbridge,
did not discount the possibility of the management rights clause qualifying the application of implied limitations in the case before him.
He examined that clause *and concluded that it lacked the specific
language necessary to "qualify the propositions enunciated herein." 8
I regard the following views of Laskin as consistent with the opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in Warrior & Gulf. (1) that there
is no absolute reservation of rights to management where the subject at hand has not been addressed in the collective agreement; (2)
that in order to remove the subject from review at arbitration there
must be language in the agreement to that effect; (3) that such
language may be found in a properly drafted management rights
clause; (4) that implications may be made in order to give "practical
or business efficacy" to the agreement, thereby imposing restrictions
on management's power to act; and (5) that a collective agreement
is unlike a conventional contract and the differences require the
development, where necessary, of special rules of interpretation. How
far the then accepted Laskin philosophy of collective agreement
interpretation differs from the current pronouncement of Canadian
courts can be seen from an examination of some recent cases.
4.

METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE ET AL.

It seems that every few years many Canadian arbitrators voice
disapproval of some decisions by the Ontario Court of Appeal or the
Supreme Court of Canada. Recently, the case of Re Metropolitan
Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police and Toronto Metropolitan
Police Association et al. 9 has received such attention. The arbitrators
disapprove of the Court's position that management may exercise
powers given to them in a management rights clause without being
fair or non-discriminatory if these powers are not required to be
exercised in a designated manner under some other provision of the
collective agreement. There is said to be no jurisdiction to have
management's exercise of such powers reviewed by an arbitrator.'
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Falconbridge,8 L.A.C. at 284.
33 Ont.2d 476 (1981).

50. Id. at 479.
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Although couched in the language of fairness, the Metro-Police
case concerned the extent to which a matter is arbitrable where the
collective agreement failed to address the subject in dispute except
in the management rights clause. The dispute concerned the taking
of inventory and the distribution of overtime for this work, and it
was alleged that management's denial of the overtime work to the
grievors was "arbitrary, discriminatory, and in bad faith."51 There was
a management rights clause, as follows:
3:01 The Association and the members recognize and
acknowledge that it is the exclusive function of the Board to:
(a) Maintain order, discipline and efficiency;(b)
Hire, discharge, direct, classify, transfer, promote,
demote and suspend or otherwise discipline any
member, provided that a claim of discriminatory
promotion, demotion or transfer or claim that any
such member has been discharged or disciplined
without reasonable cause, may be the subject of
a grievance and dealt with as hereinafter provided;(c) Generally to manage the operation and
undertaking of the Metropolitan Toronto Police
Force and without restricting the generality of the
foregoing, to select, install and require the operation of any equipment, plant and machinery which
the Board in its uncontrolled discretion deems
necessary for the efficient and economical carrying out of the operations and undertakings of the
Metropolitan Toronto Police Force.
The Board agrees that it will not exercise the
foregoing functions in a manner inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement.-2
There was no provision in the agreement specifically dealing with the
assignment of such overtime; however, the Court considered the matter included in the powers exclusively granted to management in the
management rights clause.'
An arbitral statement providing the basis for a broad fairness
obligation in a Metro-Police fact situation is found in the case of The
InternationalNickel Co. of Canada Ltd. and United Steel Workers of
51. I& at 477.
52. Id. at 478.
53. Id at 478-79.
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America Local 6500,4 decided by a board of arbitration chaired by
O.B. Shime, Q.C.5 In that case the issue concerned the obligations
of management to be fair in dealing with an employee who was
incarcerated. Was management obliged to consider fairly granting a
leave of absence to save the employee from being deemed to have
quit his employment under a provision which would have automatically
produced that result on a certain number of day absences without
a valid excuse? The agreement dealt with leaves of absence, but not
in the circumstances of the case. There was also a management rights
clause, but its contents were neither set out nor discussed in the
award.
54. 14 L.A.C.2d 13 (1977).
55. In the I.N.C.O. case, Mr. Shime stated:
It is also our view that in assessing or analyzing and remedying 'differences
between the parties' pursuant to s. 37 of the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 232, it is appropriate, subject to the express language of the
collective agreement, to infer that the parties have negotiated terms into
a collective agreement which contain the element of reasonableness.
The collective agreement is a document which governs the everyday life in the work place. It is trite to say that the parties do not negotiate
so as to cover every conceivable situation that may arise during the life
of the agreement. Not only is such a collective agreement totally impracticable to construct, but also such an agreement would harden the unspoken
and assumed into work rules and thereby create an industrial milieu, which
would have little flexibility or tolerance for the normal human work day
experiences in the plant.
Also, one must be sensitive to the nature of collective negotiations
where parties for negotiating position or on the verge of an agreement,
in order not to upset balances that have been struck both as the result
of prior conduct in the plant and through negotiations, deliberately avoid
clear and specific language preferring to have the matter resolved at
arbitration should it become necessary. Often matters are left for the
express purpose of being arbitrated should the occasion arise. Unlike other
agreements the parties understand that arbitration will form an integral
part of a collective agreement and this enters into their contemplations
and expectations when negotiating. The normal practice of the Courts
in interpreting contracts by asking 'What is the intention of the parties
to create legal relations?' is not totally realistic when interpreting collective agreements. That is not to say that a board of arbitration has complete rein to do as it pleases with the language of a collective agreement.
There are limits to an arbitrator's function, and these limits may be found
by examining not only the collective agreement but also the past experience
between the parties, the statutory context of collective bargaining, as well
as accepted industrial norms.
While there has been some attack by the Courts on the use of past
practice as an infringement of the parol evidence rule-which briefly may
be stated as the rule prohibiting extrinsic evidence to contradict, vary,
add to, or subtract from, the terms of a written agreement-the difficulty
lies in properly understanding the context in which such evidence is
admitted. Extrinsic evidence of past practice or industrial practice is often
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admitted not for the purpose of contradicting, vatying, adding to or subtracting from a document, but rather as a part of the background or
historical context against which the collective agreement is negotiated,
and enables a board of arbitration to better understand the context; Courts
have always taken the view that such evidence is admissible.
We are also of the view that the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Re McGavin Toastmaster Ltd. v. Ainscough et al. (1975),
54 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [19751 5 W.W.R. 444, 4 N.R. 618; and Syndicat Catholique
des Employes de Magasins de Quebec Inc. v. Compagnie Paquet Ltee (1959),
18 D.L.R. (2d) 346, [1959] S.C.R. 206, as well as Re Polymer Corp. and
Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 16-14 (1962), 33 D.L.R.,
(2d) 124, (19621 S.C.R. 338 sub nom. Imbleau et al. v. Laskin; C.P.R. Co.
v. Zambri (1962), 34 D.L.R., (2d) 654, [1962] S.C.R. 609, require arbitrators
to view the collective agreement not only as the boundaries of the bargain
struck by two equal parties who become co-authors of the collective agreement and responsible for its administration, but also as containing without
those boundaries an implicit assumption that the terms and provisions
of the agreement must be construed so as to operate reasonably and with
good faith during the life of the collective agreement; and this implicit
assumption of reasonableness and good faith negates any theory which
suggests that a collective agreement which must be fleshed out by
arbitration is cast in the context of an implied management rights theory.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada which hold that the
collective agreement determines the relationship between employer and
employees, defines the perimeters of that relationship and forecloses both
an external theory of management's residual rights as well as an internal
theory of management's residual rights. We are confirmed in our view
by both the statutory context of labour relations as well as the decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Polymer Corp. case . . . which
we shall deal with later in these reasons.
In our view the requirement of the Labour RelationsAct to 'further
harmonious relations between employers and employees' as well as the requirement to bargain in good faith (which ought to transcend the signing
of the document), requires an objective standard of collective agreement interpretation, and places the union as the collective bargaining agent for the
employees on an equal basis with the employer for the purpose of defining
the relationships under the collective agreement. Harmonious relationships
are not developed by subordinating one of the parties to the agreement to
the other, and it is in that context and on that premise that assumptions,
if any, are to be made. It is for those reasons that we hold that the company's
discretionary right to grant a leave of absence must be exercised on a rational or reasonably objective basis, rather than on the premise that there
is in the collective agreement an internally implied management's rights
theory which results in granting to management a complete discretion in
matters which it is compelled to administer.
The theory of reasonable administration and interpretation is supported by the arbitration award in Re Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
and Polymer Corp. Ltd. (1958), 10 L.A.C. 31 (Laskin), at p. 36, which imposed a theory of reasonable behaviour on union officials in administering the no-strike provision of the collective agreement. We read the
Polymer case as imposing an obligation on the union to reasonably administer the collective agreement in so far as its obligations are concerned.
In arriving at its decision it is apparent that both the board of arbitra-
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Most of Mr. Shime's position is consistent with the majority
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Warrior& Gulf
and with that of Professor Laskin, as he then was, in the Falconbridge case. What Mr. Shime said, however, was in one respect fundamentally different. He would appear to regard the usually broadly
worded management rights clause as having the status of the usually
broadly worded recognition clause." Whatever the complete meaning
of the internally implied management rights theory as used by Mr.
Shime, he regards it as not being a grant to "management [of] a complete discretion in matters which it is compelled to administer."57 As
is noted above, Laskin found that the management rights clause in
the Falconbridge case did not contain any authority for management
to subcontract over and above its right in the absence of the management rights clause. In Warrior & Gulf, the Supreme Court addressed
the provision respecting the reservation of certain matters to the
exclusive jurisdiction of management, and found it lacking in
specificity." Shime appears to require fairness in the administration
of the collective agreement by management whatever rights were
given it unless the agreement spelled out that management could act
in the manner disputed by the union." This is not what the United
States Supreme Court held in Warrior& GUlf nor what Laskin said
in FalconbridgeA'
The two philosophical approaches to the interpretation of collective agreements, the reserved rights and the limitation of discretion
theories, came to be examined by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the
Metro-Police case, because the Court had to consider two decisions
of the Divisional Court which could not be distinguished in any
material aspect and which were referred to the Court pursuant to
tion as well as the Supreme Court of Canada assumed that the parties
to the collective agreement are required to engage in reasonable behaviour
during its currency. There is nothing in the language of the Polymer agreement that specifically required union officials to act reasonably or in accordance with the standards set out in that case. Their behaviour was
examined against an implicit standard of reasonable behaviour. In our
view this same theory must apply equally to the company as to the union,
and the company must likewise administer its obligations in a reasonable

manner.
Id. at 17-19.
56. Id. at 19; Cf Re Studebaker-Packard, 7 L.A.C. 310, 311 (1957) (Cross, C.C.J.).
57. LN.C.O., 14 L.A.C.2d at 19.
58. Warrior,363 U.S. at 584.
59. LN.C.O., 14 L.A.C.2d at 19. Shime concludes that both an external and internal theory of management's residual rights are foreclosed. Id. at 18. In "fairness" to
Shime, I note he never expressly used the word "fairness" but did use the word
"reasonable," which is one element of fairness.
60. Warrior,363 U.S. at 584-85.
61. Falconbridge,8 L.A.C. at 284.
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section 35 of The JudicatureAct." The appeal was by the Metropolitan
Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police, pursuant to an order of
the Divisional Court. The two cases involved were Re Municipality
of Metropolitan Toronto and Toronto Civic Employees' Union Local 43
et al.,6" referred to as the "Stinson" case, and Re Municipality of
Metropolitan Toronto and Toronto Civic Employees' Union Local 43
et al.," referred to as the "Marsh" case. In these latter two cases,
the Divisional Court took conflicting philosophical views of the way
in which a collective agreement ought to be interpreted.
In the Marsh case, the question before the court was whether
there was "an overriding duty on an employer to act fairly toward
his employees in the administration of the collective agreement..."
Some of the same concerns felt by Mr. Shime in the I.N.C.O. case
were referred to by Mr. Justice Weatherston J. in the Marsh case
when he observed that the changes made by the labour legislation
had created a new relationship between employees and employers
which gave rise to an implied term in the collective agreement that
6
it be administered fairly.1
62. ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 223, S 35 (1980).
63. 10 Ont.2d 37, 62 D.L.R.3d 53 (1975).
64. 16 Ont.2d 730, 79 D.L.R.3d 249 (1977).
65. Id. at 731, 79 D.L.R.3d at 250.
66. At common law, the power of a master over his servant was such
that there was very little opportunity for a charge by a servant of unfairness. If he did not like the terms of his employment, he could look
for a new job. Now, where the relations between employees and their
employer are defined by a collective agreement, the situation is much
different. The union, as an independent contracting party, negotiates the
terms of employment of all of them. There is no room left for private
negotiations between employer and employee, but the collective agreement tells the employer on what terms he must in the future conduct
his master and servant relations: see Le Syndicat Catholique Des Employes
De Magasins De Quebec Inc. v. La Compagnie Paquet Ltee., [1959] S.C.R.
206, 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346; McGavin Toastmaster Ltd. v. Ainscough, [19761
1 S.C.R. 718, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 5 W.W.R. 444 [affirming 45 D.L.R. (3d) 687,
[1974] 3 W.W.R. 114; affirming 36 D.L.R. (3d) 309, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 505.
The majority members of the arbitration board relied on Re H.K.
(An Infant), [1967] 2 Q.B. 617, where it was held that an immigration official was required to act fairly. In that case, the official was acting in
performance of a statutory duty. However, the same general principles
apply to domestic bodies as to statutory bodies. In Breen v. Amalgamated
Engineering Union (now Amalgamated Engineering & Foundry Workers
Union) et al., [1971] 1 All E.R. 1148, Lord Denning said, at 1154:
Does all this apply also to a domestic body? I think it does, at
any rate when it is a body set up by one of the powerful associations which we see nowadays. Instances are readily to be found
in the books, notably the Stock Exchange, the Jockey Club, the
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In the Stinson case, the Ontario Divisional Court upheld the position of management, and read the management rights clause which
conferred on management the exclusive function to,
(a) Maintain order, discipline and efficiency;
(c) Generally to manage the operation and undertakings of
the Metropolitan Corporation and without restricting the
generality of the foregoing to select, install and require the
operation of any equipment, plant and machinery which the
Metropolitan Corporation in its uncontrolled discretion
deems necessary for the efficient and economical carrying
out of the operations and undertakings of the Metropolitan
Corporation."'
Football Association, and innumerable trade unions. All these

delegate power to committees. These committees are domestic
bodies which control the destinies of thousands. They have quite
as much power as the statutory bodies of which I have been
speaking. They can make or mar a man by their decisions. Not
only by expelling him from membership, but also by refusing
to admit him as a member; or, it may be, by a refusal to grant
a license or to give their approval. Often their rules are framed so as to give them a discretion. They then claim that it is
an "unfettered" discretion with which the courts have no right
to interfere. They go too far. They claim too much. The Minister
made the same claim in the Padfield case, and was roundly
rebuked by the House of Lords for his impudence. So should
we treat this claim by trade unions. They are not above the law,
but subject to it. Their rules are said to be a contract between
the members and the union. So be it. If they are a contract, then
it is an implied term that the discretion should be exercised
fairly. But the rules are in reality more than a contract. They
are a legislative code laid down by the council of the union
to be obeyed by the members. This code should be subject
to control by the courts just as much as a code laid down
by Parliament itself. If the rules set up a domestic body and
give it a discretion, it is to be implied that that body must
exercise its discretion fairly. Even though its functions are
not judicial or quasi-judicial, but only administrative, still it
must act fairly.
I think the same language can be applied to an employer in the administration of a collective agreement. He is dealing, not with individual employees
employed under separate contracts of service, but with employees whose
terms of employment are set out in an agreement negotiated on behalf of
them all. Any discretion to be exercised by the employer must be exercised
in the knowledge that each employee is only one of many; no one of them
should be singled out for special treatment. This obviously implies that the
agreement should be administered fairly.
Id. at 732-33, 79 D.L.R.3d at 251-52.
67. Stinson, 10 Ont.2d at 39, 62 D.L.R.3d at 55.
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as including the power to schedule vacations. In the absence of something "elsewhere in the agreement or by necessary implication [that]
confers the right on an employee to challenge management's decision
on the subject of when he should take his vacation.""8 The matter
was not arbitrable.
The Stinson case did not follow an extreme management rights
position. It found in the management rights clause an unfettered
delegation to management of the right to schedule an employee's vacation, while recognizing that the agreement might by "necessary
implication" affect the extent of management's discretion. Nevertheless, Stinson is clearly at odds with the philosophy of the Marsh
case which accords with that of Mr. Shime in the I.N.C.O. case.
In the Metro-Police case, the Court of Appeal rejected the
proposition that an arbitrator can review management decisions made
pursuant to a management rights clause and which do not contravene
any other provision of the agreement, because the management decision was not made fairly and without discrimination. It also held that
Weatherston, J., in the Marsh case, is supposed to have relied on procedural fairness decisions before a domestic and statutory body and
not on cases dealing with the interpretation of a collective agreement.6
The court concluded:
The Stinson and Marsh cases were decided on different factual situations and on different collective agreements from
the present one. If, however, the majority of the Divisional
Court in the Marsh case were purporting to lay down a
general rule, that all decisions of management pursuant to
a management rights clause which do not contravene any
other provisions of the agreement must stand the further
test whether in the opinion of an arbitrator they were made
fairly and without discrimination, then with respect we do
not agree. The decisions relied on by Weatherston J. in the
Marsh case, as that learned Judge rightly pointed out, dealt
with procedural fairness in proceedings before domestic and
statutory bodies; they did not deal with the interpretation
of collective agreements. In our opinion, the management
rights clause gives management the exclusive right to determine how it shall exercise the powers conferred on it by
that clause, unless those powers are otherwise circumscribed
by express provisions of the collective agreement. The
68.
69.

Id.
Metro-Police, 33 Ont.2d at 478.
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power to challenge a decision of management must be found
in some provision of the collective agreement."
Houlden J.A., speaking for the Court, could not have been more clear
in his rejection of the position taken by Mr. Shime and by
Weatherston.
The length and detailed nature of the collective agreement were
also factors which caused the Court in Metro-Police to conclude that
there was "no necessity in this case to imply a term that the management rights clause will be applied fairly and without discrimination."
The court stated that within the exclusive authority of the management rights clause, management may act unfairly and
"discriminatively." Not only may the employer behave unfairly and
discriminatively, but the Court of Appeal also reinforced its opinion
by stating that the board of arbitration had "no jurisdiction to deal
with the dispute because of an alleged and improper exercise of
management rights." The Court of Appeal was remarkably persistent
in advancing its position. It followed, of necessity, that:
when the arbitrator determined that there was no provision in the collective agreement that governed the taking
of inventory, the work in dispute, and the distribution of
overtime, she should have ruled that she had no jurisdiction to deal with the dispute because of an alleged improper
exercise of management rights."
There is a danger that too much will be made of Metro-Police
by those who support it, and too little by those who oppose its
findings. Significantly, the Court of Appeal did not adopt an extreme
reserved rights theory of contract interpretation. Management's
powers were seen by the Court of Appeal to be derived from the
management rights clause found in that agreement and not from
management rights external to the agreement. In Warrior & Gulf,
the trial court and the appellate court accepted the theory of rights
reserved to management external to the collective agreement. This
view was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States, which
did not, however, discount the possibility of an internal mandate to
management on the subject. However, on examination, the Court found
70. Id. at 478-89.
71. Id. at 479. Nevertheless, my interpretation of Metro-Police is that management must still, at the very least, behave with honesty of purpose and this has been the
view of subsequent cases. See, Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Ontario (Minister
of Health) and Ontario Public Service Employees Union, G.R. Linehan and the Grievance
Settlement Board, unreported case of Ontario Divisional Court dated Sept. 3, 1982.
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none sufficiently clear so as to enable it to withdraw the dispute from
arbitration.
If the Court of Appeal in Metro-Police had subscribed to an
extreme reserved rights theory of collective bargaining interpretation, it could have found the existence of a management rights clause
irrelevant. Where the agreement is completely silent on the subject,
it is still open to the Court, in another case, to develop a theory of
management's obligations beyond those stated in Metro-Police. Because
of the Canadian courts' relegation of reliance on the practice of the
parties largely to cases where the agreement is ambiguous or to cases
where a promissory estoppel arises, it is most unlikely that the act
in dispute would have to conform with past practice not previously
objected to by the union. It is clear, however, that the act would have
to be undertaken in good faith and not as a subterfuge to suppress
express terms of the agreement. The latter obligation survives MetroPolice where, it will be noted, that question was remitted back to
the arbitrator. 2 It could also be argued that even under the MetroPolice rule the act would not be a genuine exercise of rights under
the management rights clause if it was demonstrably not dictated by
requirements of the business for efficiency, economy, or expeditious
performance. Hence, such an act would be undertaken nalafides and
should suffer the same fate which would befall an act intended to
evade substantive provisions of the collective agreement. In the
absence of any treatment of the subject in the agreement, there should
be less difficulty in demonstrating bad faith.
A recent case decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal, Re Council of Printing Industries of Canada and Toronto Printing Pressmen
3
and Assistants Union No. 10 et al."
is consistent with my interpretation of Metro-Police. There, the Court held that a clause outside the
absolute restrictions of a management rights clause fell to be interpreted by employing certain conventional rules of contract interpretation. In that case it was held that the clause in dispute should be
read along with other clauses in the agreement and that an attempt

72.

In an unreported award, released in May of 1983, the arbitrator, M. K.

Saltman, at page 3 noted that the issue remitted back to her by the Court of Appeal was
whether the action of the Board of Commissioners of Police was disciplinary in nature,
the position of the Board being that the denial of overtime was not a matter of discipline.
The arbitrator found the true nature of the denial of overtime to be disciplinary, and it
was acknowledged by the Board that if this were the case, there was no just cause for
having imposed it. This is an example of the purported exercise of a right under the management rights clause being a subterfuge. The real reason for the act was to avoid the requirements of another provision of the agreement. In such case the act was not engaged
in bona fides.

73.

42 Ont.2d 404 (1983).
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should be made to harmonize competing clauses. ' In so doing, the
arbitration board majority concluded that certain obligations of fairness
were imposed on management in its administration of the disputed
clause so as to harmonize it with seniority rights granted employees
under the agreement. In the absence of a clear right to exercise
unfettered discretion, as might be granted by a properly worded
management rights clause, it could be argued that to give "practical
and business efficacy" to the agreement, the exercise of a right by
management ought to accommodate certain employee and union rights
contained in other provisions of the agreement. This is what the Court
of Appeal appears to have enunciated in the C.P.I. case.75 It would
require some reasonable accommodation by management of job
security rights of employees, including seniority rights, if only by way
of the imposition of a requirement that the act not be unreasonable,
arbitrary, discriminatory nor intended to harm, prejudice or undermine the union. Unreasonableness would exist if the company were
intent on depriving a substantial number of employees of work covered
by the agreement.
5.

THE FUTURE OF FAIRNESS IN CANADA

I conclude that neither Canadian nor American jurisprudence supports either an extreme reserved rights or an extreme implied limitations theory. In the absence of a clause granting unfettered discretion to management, the American position, as enunciated in Warrior & Gulf, is that management's power to act is limited and that
the extent of such limitations is to be derived from the collective
agreement as interpreted by the arbitrator. If the matter is arguably
arbitrable, the doubt is to be resolved in favour of the arbitrator making that decision. The ultimate decision on the merits, except in
extraordinary cases, should be left to the arbitrator, and the court

74. Id. at 411. Although the Court reproduced extensive portions of the award,
which clearly indicated that the Board majority supported the Shime approach to contract administration as set out in the I.N.C.O.case, the Court rested its decision on the
Board's being able to conclude that the seniority rights provisions of the agreement would
be "seriously affected" by the exercise of the act in dispute. The Court held that the conclusion of the Board majority as to management's fairness obligations in the administration of the collective agreement was one it was entitled to arrive at. Id.
75. Cf. the statements to this effect of Laskin in Falconbridge,8 L.A.C.2d at 282.
76. I would emphasize that the latter comments deal with a case unlike MetroPolice.In Metro-Policethe arbitrator was found by the Court of Appeal to have decided
that the power in dispute (to award overtime during the plant shut-down) was provided
for in the management rights clause which was in terms of an "exclusive" grant of authority
to management. See Metro-Police,33 Ont.2d at 478.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/6

Gorsky: Management Rights Revisited: How the Good Ship Warrior & Gulf Sa
1984]

MANAGEMENT RIGHTS REVISITED

should intervene only reluctantly, if at all. In arriving at a conclusion, arbitrators have available to them a wider array of interpretive
devices than in a conventional case involving contract interpretation.
Most important of these is the common law of the plant, referred to
in Warrior& Gulf, especially the unwritten practices governing the
parties' relationship.
Metro-Police, too, avoids taking any extreme position. As did the
United States Supreme Court in Warrior& Gulf and Professor Laskin
in Falconbridge,the Ontario Court of Appeal in Metro-Police examined
the agreement and found no specific reference to the subject at issue.
The Court did find, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court and Laskin
did not, the existence of an unfettered discretion in the management
rights clause, governing the disputed power." Hence, the court found
what was, in effect, non-arbitrability: the same issue as existed in Warrior & Gulf. To me, the significance of Metro-Police is that it cannot
be read as permitting management to act with unfettered discretion
where the rights granted to it in the collective agreement do not make
this clear, whether these rights are found in the management rights
clause or elsewhere in the agreement. Subsequent cases make it clear
that even in a Metro-Police fact situation, a good-faith exercise of
management rights is required. Where an apparent good-faith exercise of those rights results in a decision which is one that the
arbitrator concludes could not be consistent with the exercise of the
right, then it would be open to declare the act to have been carried
out in bad faith. Such a situation could exist, for example, where
hospital orderlies were required to have one year of medical school
training as a pre-requisite for appointment to their position.
Finally, in rejecting the Marsh decision, the Court of Appeal in
Metro-Police did so with reference to that case's seeming pronouncement of a rule that fairness was required of management in the
administration of collective agreements, even where the act in question was, by the terms of the agreement, capable of being exercised
by management in its unfettered discretion28 This left for further decision a case like Warrior & Gulf, where the agreement is completely
77. In fact it was a finding made by the arbitrator and accepted by the Court:
Since the collective agreement contained no express provisions dealing with
the matters in dispute, the arbitrator then proceeded to consider if they con-

stituted a violation of the management rights clause. On the basis of the decision of the majority of the Divisional Court in the Marshcase, the arbitrator
held that the board had to exercise the rights conferred by art. 3.01 fairly
and without discrimination.
Metro-Police, 33 Ont.2d at 477-78.

78. Id. at 478.
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silent on the subject.
Given the "track record" of Canadian courts and their rejection
of "law of the plant" theories, the most that may be expected is the
maintenance of a theory of contract interpretation consistent with that
pronounced in the C.P.I. case. There, in accordance with conventional
rules of contract interpretation, an attempt would be made to harmonize other clauses.in the agreement with management's right to
manage, in order to give the agreement what Laskin referred to as
"practical and business efficacy."79
The number of factors of fairness required of management to
be developed by arbitrators in Canada will, no doubt, be fewer than
in the United States because of the more restricted rules of interpretation available to Canadian arbitrators and because of the greater
availability of judicial review in Canada. Nevertheless, the possibilities
for development of a jurisprudence of fairness in Canada, in a Warrior & Gu/f fact situation, are still alive notwithstanding the decision
in Metro-Police which is restricted to cases where unfettered discretion to act has been vested in management by the provisions of the
collective agreement.
6.

RESCUING LASKIN FROM HIS DEFENDERS AND INTERPRETERS 80

Some commentators regard the Laskin philosophy of collective
agreement interpretation to be closer to the Shime position than I
do. My reason for differentiating their closely related views is based
on Shime's unwillingness to be moved by either the external or internal view of an implied management rights theory." That Laskin would
be moved by a sufficiently clear management rights clause seems clear.
This is supported by his reference in Falconbridge' to the award of
3 Judge
the late Judge Cross as an arbitrator in Studebaker-Packard."
Cross differentiated the management rights clause in the case before
him from the one with which the late Judge Lang was faced as an
arbitrator in CanadianWestinghouse Co.,' a management rights clause

79. Falconbridge,8 L.A.C. at 282.
80. In writing this article I accept the risk of joining this number. However, Chief
Justice Laskin has only himself to blame. In 1965, he discussed with me the prospects
in law teaching. Unwittingly, he influenced my decision to become a law teacher and to
engage in such exercises as led me to prepare this paper.
81. I.N.C.O., 14 L.A.C.2d at 18.
82. Falconbridge,8 L.A.C. at 282.
83. 7 L.A.C. 310 (1977).
84. 4 L.A.C. 1536 (1953).
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viewed by Judge Cross as being "broader and more general in its
terms than in the case before me."" Judge Cross stated: "Apart from
the Westinghouse decision, I must decide in any event what the particular management rights clause means."" His interpretation was that
it did not include the bringing of outside contractors into the plant
to do work ordinarily done by members of the bargaining unit at the
time the collective agreement was signed. Of further interest is the
relevant portion of the clause in question: "Except as otherwise
expressly provided in this agreement nothing contained in this agreement shall be deemed to limit the company in any way in the exercise of regular and customary functions of management."87 As in the
Warrior & Gulf case, these "functions" were not elaborated upon in
the collective agreement. Nor was there any proof of a regular and
customary contracting out in the manner attempted by management.
I do not believe it is possible to miss Laskin's point that the management rights clause cannot be ignored. But there is no magic in the
name "management rights" clause. The force of the clause will depend
on its language.
The so-called Laskin school has been placed in opposition to the
reserved rights school. A prominent Canadian arbitrator, Harry
Arthurs, took such a position in Re Russelsteel Ltd.s He identified
the reserved rights school as permitting "contracting-out in the
absence of some express prohibition in the collective agreement." Protagonists of this school were said to rely on "the typical management
rights clause [as reserving] to the employer all his pre-collective
bargaining rights, save those which have been expressly bargained
away in collective negotiations.""
The Laskin philosophy identified by Arthurs is taken from a
Peterboro Lock extract. This is only part of the Laskin philosophy,
for as is evident from the extracts which I have quoted from the
Falconbridge case, Laskin does not ignore the management rights
clause as a possible source of unfettered discretion. The most that
can be said is that Laskin's view of the collective bargaining process
would predispose him to be more demanding in finding in a management rights clause the unfettered power to act as claimed by management. Before finding in its often general language that the particular
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Studebaker-Packard,7 L.A.C. at 310, 312.
Id. at 312-13.
Id. at 311.
Re Russelsteel Ltd., 17 L.A.C. 253 (1966).
Id. at 254.
Id. at 254, citing Peterboro Lock, 4 L.A.C. 1499 (1953).
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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power claimed by management had been granted, he would likely
require more direct and precise language than would often be the
case where the same clause fell to be interpreted by an arbitrator
of the reserved rights school.
When the union in Metro-Police applied for leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada, included in the three judge panel hearing the matter was Chief Justice Laskin. To the surprise and shock
of some, he joined in the unanimous decision to reject leave.2 The
reasons for refusing leave are not recorded; however, I do not believe
too much should be read into that refusal. The Court of Appeal in
Metro-Police acted on the basis that the arbitrator had found in the
management rights clause the unfettered right in management to
assign overtime during the period of inventory taking. Management
rights clauses, being somewhat unwieldy instruments, leave considerable leeway for those interpreting them. That the management
rights clause in Metro-Police could be read as reposing the particular
unfettered power in management does not appear to have been contested, and the conclusion of the arbitrator does not conflict with the
Court's view of the clause. That being the case, what was there left
for the Supreme Court to review? In order for the appeal to succeed,
the Shime view, as represented in the Marsh case, would have to be
accepted: that even in the face of a management rights clause granting an unfettered discretion to management in carrying out the
disputed act, management would have to act fairly, in some sense
beyond mere bona fides. The Supreme Court judges hearing the application appear to have concluded that was not a matter requiring
further elaboration. In doing so, they did not, in my view, depart from
the position of the United States Supreme Court in Warrior & Gulf.
At least there is left open a basis for a finding not inconsistent with
that in Warrior & Gulf.
The above examination does not, in my view, disclose any change
in the philosophical approach to the interpretation of collective
agreements on the part of Chief Justice Laskin from the days when
he was an arbitrator. Any conclusion to the contrary is based on a
misreading of his earlier position. As to that position, which is not
at all out of harmony with that of the United States Supreme Court
in Warrior & Gulf, no one would pretend that it is favoured by a
majority of judges. Nevertheless, as was demonstrated in the C.P.I.
case, conventional contract rules can be used inventively to discover
the existence of limitations on the discretion of management to do
92. Leave to appeal dismissed October 19. 1981 (Laskin C.J.C., Dickson and McIntyre J.J.). See comments of the editors of Labour ArbitrationNews, Sept. 1982, at 5.
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as it alone sees fit. While not as extensive as those devices available
in the United States in cases subject to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Warrior & Gulf, they may, nevertheless, be meaningful. They are
unlikely to be so, however, if those who argue cases for unions
endeavor to ignore the real messages of Metro-Police and C.P.I. (and
by osmosis, Warrior & Gulfl and continue to argue for the acceptance
of the broadest view of the Shime approach. 3
7.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MANAGEMENT RIGHTS:
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

As a result of my analysis of the Canadian and American
jurisprudence, I have concluded that the United States Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeal of Ontario have arrived at a number of similar
conclusions:
(1) that the extreme reserved management rights theory
does not apply. In the absence of an unfettered right
granted to management with respect to the exercise of a
particular right, management is not free to act as it pleases.
The nature and extent of the limitations will depend on the
provisions of the collective agreement that may be affected
by the exercise of the right and there can be no "one size
fits all" rule. While the validity of this conclusion is clearer
in the American jurisprudence, the Metro-Police case can
be seen to be consistent with my view. This is because it
would be irrelevant, in that case, whether the unfettered
power was found in the management rights clause, if the
extreme reserved management rights theory applied. If the
Court of Appeal considered such a theory as applicable it
would have been unnecessary for it to stress the effect of
the unfettered power having been granted in the management rights clause. The C.P.I. case is also consistent with
my conclusions.

93. My position does not ignore the fact that when management rights clauses
are interpreted, the presence or absence of unfettered discretion may lie in the eye of
the beholder. In the United States, a finding of unfettered discretion is less likely to be

arrived at. Given the findings in Metro-Policeand C.P.I., should an arbitrator in Ontario
find that the language of the management rights clause does not grant an unfettered discretion to management with respect to the matter in dispute, how willing will a reviewing
court be to find that interpretation one that the language of the agreement will not
reasonably bear? Where the court does not quash the award in such a case, there will
be a considerable basis for arbitrators to further develop a jurisprudence of implied limita-

tions but with less abandon than has been the case in the United States.
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(2) Where an unfettered power to act has been granted to
management, it is still subject to being exercised bonafides.
If exercised with a view to achieving a prohibited goal, for
example, discharge or discipline in the absence of just cause,
the power could not be said to have been exercised
genuinely. Where the aim of management, in exercising its
power, is to achieve a purpose unrelated to the management of the enterprise, a serious question would arise as
to the bona fides of management: Was it really acting pursuant to a provision directed at the management of the
enterprise or was it attempting to achieve a prohibited goal?
(3) The law does not unduly interfere with the carrying out
of necessary management functions. In avoiding the extreme
positions, the law affords management the authority to
manage the enterprise without the need to secure union
consent at every turn, provided that such exercise does not
conflict with rights granted to the union in the agreement.
(4) Similarly, the union will not be subject to the whim or
caprice of management. The courts, in rejecting the more
extreme management position, restrict management's unfettered power to act to cases where such power has been
granted by the collective agreement. Unfettered power to
act, subject always to the power being exercised bonafides,
will be a result of the agreement. Where competing clauses
in the agreement conflict with the exercise of an unfettered
power, an honest attempt must be made to harmonize competing provisions in accordance with conventional rules of
contract interpretation.
I am supported in my conclusions by the fact that David Feller,
who was counsel for the United Steelworkers of America in the Trilogy
cases, has acknowledged the fact that the law in the United States
does not interfere with management's right to manage the enterprise
as long as it is pursuing business purposes which do not interfere
with union rights under the agreement.9 4
I would characterize the response of the courts in the two countries as a reasonable and realistic accommodation to the goals inherent
in the relevant collective bargaining legislation. The fairness achieved

94.

Feller, A GeneralTheory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF.

L. RaV. 633 (1973). "On matters covered by the agreement and within the limits imposed
by it either expressly or impliedly, management is free to manage, without either
immediate or ultimate restraint. . ." Id. at 770.
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in carrying out the dictates of the courts may not meet an ideal standard of justice or the realization of rights viewed from a more
theoretical perspective. I have, however, made no attempt to develop
a more general and abstract theory of management rights more consistent with employees having a greater role in collectively deciding
the nature of the life they will lead with each other in and through
their work. In doing so:
(1) I have tried to follow Dworkin's admonition that
jurisprudence should relate to the real problems of the legal
profession."
(2) I was also mindful of Fried's observation that it is too
often the case that jurisprudential studies fail to be relevant to the problems of lawyers, because they end too far
off the ground." As a result, they may fail to reach that
potential audience of lawyers and others with an interest
in jurisprudence but no special expertise in the area.
(3) I was also affected by Fried's statement that the
knowledge and experience of judges tends to reduce the
role of formal philosophical analysis as a vital element in
judicial decision making." Justice Blackmun of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in a very candid interview
reported in the New York Times, acknowledged as much.
While admitting to an interest in the writings of Rawls and
Nozick, he stated frankly that the more abstract jurisprudential literature was usually beyond his comprehension.98 I do not believe Justice Blackmun is untypical of
judges.
(4) I agree with Coval and Smith, although they wrote in
the context of tort law, that the goal or purpose of a statute
is important in determining the operation of that statute."
Solutions to problems of interpretation may be obtained by
employing a lower level of abstraction. Underlying the
process may be "a complex set or orderings," yet the resolution is "ideally . . .consistent with the ongoing processes
of social life. The matrix of the law.., is the accumulation
DWORKIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (1977).
96. Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law: or What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 57 (1979). In fairness, I should note that he also included Dworkin in that number.
97. Id. at 73.
98. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, S 6 (Magazine), at 61.
99. Coval & Smith, Rights, Goals and Hard Cases, 2 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 465
(1983).
100. Id. at 468-69.
95.
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of wisdom from generations of experience in coping with
social conflict . .. ."00
(5) Judges, in surveying the "matrix of the law," would
necessarily have to be affected by the dominant economic
theories prevalent in society, if only as part of their
"accumulation of wisdom." Although theories of market
economics continue to represent the dominant economic
theme for most judges in deciding labour law cases, modern
Canadian and American labour legislation has reflected the
impact of Keynesian economics. This impact does not appear
to have been lost sight of by the courts in deciding Warrior & Gulf and Metro-Police.With the growth in acceptance
of neo-classical economics and the relative decline of support for Keynesian economic theories, it may be that future
developments in labour law will also reflect this change.
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